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Abstract
In this paper, we focus on how to dynamically allocate a divisible resource fairly among n
players who arrive and depart over time. The players may have general heterogeneous valuations
over the resource. It is known that exact envy-free and proportional allocations may not exist
in the dynamic setting [23]. Thus, we will study to what extent we can guarantee the fairness in
the dynamic setting. We first design two algorithms which are O(log n)-proportional and O(n)-
envy-free for the setting with general valuations, and by constructing the adversary instances
such that all dynamic algorithms must be at least Ω(1)-proportional and Ω( n
logn
)-envy-free, we
show that the bounds are tight up to a logarithmic factor. Moreover, we introduce the setting
where the players’ valuations are uniform on the resource but with different demands, which
generalize the setting of [12]. We prove an O(log n) upper bound and a tight lower bound for
this case.
1 Introduction
Initiated by the work of [19], the fair division problem has been widely studied in the literature of
economics, mathematics and computer science [10, 20, 1, 5, 6, 18, 3]. It mainly considers the problem
of fairly allocating a divisible resource among a group of players who have different preferences over
the resource.
To capture fairness, many solution concepts have been proposed, such as proportionality and
envy-freeness [6, 15, 22, 10]. An allocation is proportional if each player’s valuation for his received
resource is at least 1n fraction of his valuation for the whole resource, where n is the number of
players. An allocation is envy-free if no player values another player’s allocation more than his own
[19]. One of the difficulties in finding allocations which are proportional or envy-free is that the
resource may not be uniformly structured, such as time and land, and different players may hold
different valuations over the same part of the resource.
Most of the previous studies have been focused on the static fair division problem, which as-
sumes that all players arrive simultaneously. Recently, the dynamic fair division problem has been
considered in [23, 12, 13]. A real-life application of the dynamic fair division problem is to fairly
allocate the resource on a server among different jobs. In this case, different jobs arrive and depart
at different time, and each job has different values for the resource allocated to it. The objective here
is to balance the resource allocated to different jobs. Unlike the static setting where an envy-free
allocation is guaranteed to exist [5, 21], [23] shows that envy-free or proportional allocations may
not exist when the players arrive one by one over time. Therefore, a weak version of envy-freeness
is discussed in [23], where the only constraint is that each player does not envy the allocations of
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the players who will arrive after him. However, this may not be sufficient to capture fairness in
reality because the players may still observe the allocations of the previous players and envy their
allocations. For example, an allocation which allocates the whole resource to the first player is con-
sidered to be envy-free in [23], which is not plausible. Thus it is natural to explore to what extent
we can approximate the envy-freeness and proportionality in the dynamic setting. This problem has
been discussed in the literature, but they only considered the case where the players have uniform
valuations. In [12], there is a single resource, and in [13], there are multiple resources and the players
have different demands for each resource. The latter one seems a general problem, but it can still
be reduced to the problem with a single divisible resource while each player has piecewise linear
valuations. We prove the results for settings with valuations more general than [12, 13].
Our Models and Results. In this paper, we aim at designing algorithms for the dynamic fair
division (DFD) problem so that the maximum “dissatisfaction” among all players is minimized. We
allow the players to have arbitrary heterogeneous yet additive valuations, which is a general class of
valuations considered in almost all the fair division literature [16]. In our model, different players
arrive and depart at different time, and the decision maker needs to decide each player’s allocation
upon his arrival. We say an allocation is ξ-envy-free if at any time, each player’s valuation on
his allocation is at least 1ξ fraction of his value on any other player’s allocation. An allocation is
σ-proportional if at any time, each player’s value on his own allocation is at least 1σn fraction of his
value on the whole resource. We refer to ξ and σ as the approximation ratio of the allocation.
The algorithms proposed in this paper are τ -recallable algorithms with τ ∈ Z+, which means
when a new player arrives, the decision maker can recall the resource from at most τ previous players
and reallocate it [12]. If reallocation is not permitted, it is easy to see that the approximation ratio
is unbounded, because for any dynamic algorithm, the adversary can always choose the valuation
for the second player such that he is only interested in the allocation of the first player. In this
paper, we will focus on the 1-recallable algorithms and at the end of each section, we will briefly
discuss the τ -recallable algorithms for any constant τ , since they basically share the same idea and
the same bound.
Our first contribution is to design two dynamic 1-recallable algorithms for the general DFD
problem which are O(n)-envy-free and O(log n)-proportional. Then we prove that for any dynamic
1-recallable algorithm, there exists an adversary instance such that the approximation ratio of the
algorithm is at least Ω( nlogn), even if all the players’ valuations are piecewise uniform [9]. Since
the Ω(1) lower bound for proportionality is already proved in [12], all our bounds are tight up to a
logarithmic factor.
Because of the strong lower bound in the general setting, no one can hope to improve the fairness
for settings with valuations more general than the piecewise uniform valuations. Thus, it is natural
to discover the set of valuations with better dynamic performance. In [12], the authors show that
if the players’ valuations are uniform, there exist O(1)-envy-free algorithms. In this paper, we
generalize their model, by allowing different players to have different demands over the resource.
When the players have uniform valuations with different demands, an allocation is fair if (1) it meets
all the players’ demands or (2) each player gets at least his demand divided by total demand [14].
As before, in the static setting, a fair allocation always exists. However, in the dynamic setting, the
adversary can manipulate the future players to violate the fairness. We say an allocation is η-fair if
each player gets 1η fraction of his allocated resource in a fair allocation. We design an O(log n)-fair
1-recallable algorithm and we prove that the bound is tight by constructing an adversary instance
such that no 1-recallable algorithm can be better than Ω(log n)-fair.
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Additional Related Work. The fair division problem with multiple indivisible resources is also
a problem widely studied in the literature [8, 17, 2, 7, 11]. Since the envy-free allocation cannot
be guaranteed in this setting, the notion of fairness is captured by different relaxed versions, such
as envy-free up to one item, which can be found by a round robin procedure [8]. Another solution
concept adopted for indivisible resourses is the maxmin share, which can be approximated within a
factor of 2/3 in polynomial time if the number of players is a constant [17]. [2] improves the result
by designing an algorithm for any number of players which runs in polynomial time and guarantees
the same approximation ratio. When the valuations of the players are submodular, the maximin
fair allocation can be approximated with a factor of 10 [4].
2 Preliminaries
Fair Division Problem. The fair division problem is to divide and allocate a divisible and
heterogeneous resource fairly among n players, where the resource is represented by the real number
interval [0, 1] and the player set is represented by N = {1, · · · , n}. Each player i has a valuation
vi, mapping any subset of the resource to a nonnegative value, representing i’s preference over the
resource. Formally, for any set I ⊆ [0, 1], player i’s value for taking set I is vi(I) ∈ R+ ∪ {0}.
The valuation profile is denoted by v = {v1, . . . , vn} and the set of all possible valuation profiles is
denoted by V. In this paper, besides the most general valuations, we also consider two special ones.
One widely studied valuation is piecewise uniform valuation [9]. A player has piecewise uniform
valuation if and only if he has uniform valuation over a subset of the resource (which may not be a
continuous interval). That is, for player i, the valuation vi is piecewise uniform if and only if there
exists Ii ⊆ [0, 1] such that vi(I) = |I ∩ Ii| for all I ⊆ [0, 1]. By normalizing each player’s valuation
to range [0, 1], we have that for any I ⊆ [0, 1], vi(I) =
|I∩Ii|
|Ii|
.
Another valuation studied in this paper is called uniform with demand. In this model, each
player has uniform valuation over the resource and he only cares the size of the resources he gets
rather than which part of the resource is allocated to him. In general, different players may have
different demand over the resource, and when the allocated resource exceeds the player’s demand,
his valuation for the allocated resource will not increase. For player i, we denote his demand
as di ∈ (0, 1], and his valuation vi is uniform with demand if and only if for any I ⊆ [0, 1],
vi(I) = min{|I|, di}. By normalizing each player’s valuation to range [0, 1], we have that for any
I ⊆ [0, 1], vi(I) = min{
|I|
di
, 1}. In our paper, we adopt the normalized form of the valuations, but
all the results hold for the valuations without normalization.
An allocation is denoted by a partition of [0, 1], A = (A0, A1, · · · , An) where A0 is the unallocated
resource and Ai is the resource allocated to player i for any i ∈ N . The set of all such possible
partitions of [0, 1] is denoted by U . A fair division algorithm (or an allocation rule) A is a mapping
from a valuation profile to an allocation, i.e., A : V → U .
Two widely adopted fairness solution concept are proportionality and envy-freeness. An alloca-
tion A is proportional if and only if each player gets at least 1n fraction of the whole resource, and
an allocation A is envy-free if and only if each player will not envy any other player’s allocation.
In this paper, we care more about the relaxed version of them. Formally, we say an allocation
A is σ-proportional if vi(Ai) ≥ 1σnvi([0, 1]) for any player i, and an allocation A is ξ-envy-free if
vi(Ai) ≥
1
ξ vi(Aj) for any player i and j.
When players’ valuations are uniform with demand, a fairness solution concept stronger than
proportionality is required here because for a proportional allocation AP , it only guarantees that
for each player i, vi(APi ) ≥
vi([0,1])
n =
1
n . However, in the static setting there exists an allocation A
such that each player i gets dimax{d,1} fraction of the whole resource, where d =
∑
j∈N dj is the total
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demand of the players, and player i’s value is guaranteed to be vi(Ai) = 1max{d,1} . Since the total
demand d might be significantly smaller than n, vi(Ai) might be significantly larger than vi(APi ).
Therefore, a stronger notion of fairness is defined as follows for uniform with demand valuations
[14]. Formally, an allocation A is fair if vi(Ai) ≥ 1max{d,1} , and A is η-fair if vi(Ai) ≥
1
η·max{d,1} .
Dynamic Fair Division Problem. Now we extend the fair division problem to the dynamic
setting, where player i arrives at time ti and departs at time tdi , with t
d
i > ti. Without loss of
generality, we have 0 < t1 ≤ t2 ≤ · · · ≤ tn, where n is the maximum number of players that
could possibly arrive and is given to the algorithm as an input. However, the algorithm does not
know the exact number of arriving players, or the playersâĂŹ valuations until their arrival. The
algorithm needs to allocate the resource to each player when he arrives without knowing future
events, including his departure time. In this paper, we will design our algorithms and state our
results for the arrival only model, where td1 = t
d
2 = · · · = t
d
n > tn. However, all our lower bounds
and upper bounds can be directly applied for settings where players have arbitrary departure time
with the same approximation ratio. Generally speaking, the lower bounds holds since the arrival
only model is a special case of the model with departures. Thus the adversary instances constructed
for the arrival only model can be directly applied to the model with departures to get the same
bound. For the upper bound, we can simply recall the resource of the departed player and leave
it unallocated. By going through our analysis for the arrival only model, we can show that all the
bounds carry through in the model with departures.
Formally, the allocation of the algorithm at time ti is denoted by Ai = (Ai0, A
i
1, · · · , A
i
i) and
the total output from time 0 to time tn is denoted by A = (Ai)i∈{0,1,··· ,n} where A
0 = {A00} and
A00 = [0, 1]. An algorithm is called τ -recallable if for any i ∈ [n− 1], there exists s ≤ min{τ, i} and
a set of players S = {i1, · · · , is} ⊆ [i] such that A
i+1
j = A
i
j for all j ∈ [i]\S, and A
i+1
j ⊆ A
i
j for all
j ∈ S.
In the following we extend the definition for fairness to the dynamic setting. An allocation A is
σ-proportional if
∀i,∀j ≤ i, vj(A
i
j) ≥
1
σ · i
vj([0, 1]);
and an allocation A is ξ-envy-free if
∀i,∀j, j′ ≤ i, vj(A
i
j) ≥
1
ξ
vj(A
i
j′).
For the uniform with demand valuations in the dynamic setting, an allocation A is η-fair if
∀i,∀j ≤ i, vj(A
i
j) ≥
1
η ·max{
∑
l≤i dl, 1}
.
In this paper, we say an algorithm A is σ-proportional, ξ-envy-free or η-fair for valuation space
V if for any valuation profile v ∈ V, A(v) is σ-proportional, ξ-envy-free or η-fair. Note that, since
we do not assume that the resource must be allocated to any player, a trivial envy-free algorithm
is that everyone gets nothing. Such an algorithm is called empty in this paper.
Remark. In this paper, we only consider deterministic algorithms because there exists a trivial
randomized algorithm which is proportional and envy-free in expectation in the dynamic setting
[9]. This randomized algorithm is also fair for uniform with demand valuations.
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3 Dynamic Fair Division (DFD) Problem
First we state the results for proportionality. In Theorem 6.1 of [12], no 1-recallable algorithm can be
better than (2 ln 2)-proportional even if the players’ valuations are uniform, i.e., vi(I) = |I|,∀i ∈ [n].
In the following, we design the 1-recallable algorithm A1DFD, defined in Algorithm 1, which is
O(log n)-proportional for the DFD problem with general valuations. Roughly speaking, when player
i arrives, algorithm A1DFD divides the previous players’ allocated resource into 2i(3 + ln i) subsets
and lets player i choose his favorite bundle of resource from one player, where the size of the
bundle depends on the current approximation ratio of any player j who arrived before player i. The
performance of algorithm A1DFD is formally analyzed in Theorem 1.
Algorithm 1 1-Recallable Algorithm A1DFD
Input: A sequence of players N = {1, · · · , n} arriving and departing along time.
1: Initially, Aij = ∅ for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 0 ≤ j ≤ i.
2: When the first player arrives, setting A11 = [0, 1].
3: for any arriving player i > 1 do
4: σ = ⌊2i(3 + ln i)⌋.
5: for 0 < j < i do
6: Partition Ai−1j into σ sets {A
i−1
j,1 , · · · , A
i−1
j,σ } with vj(A
i−1
j,1 ) = · · · = vj(A
i−1
j,σ ).
7: σj = ⌈
vj([0,1])
vj(A
i−1
j )
⌉.
8: end for
9: (j∗, S∗) = arg max
j<i,S⊆[σ],
|S|=σ−σj
{
∑
k∈S vi(A
i−1
j,k )}.
10: Aii = ∪k∈S∗A
i−1
j∗,k.
11: Aij∗ = ∪k/∈S∗A
i−1
j∗,k.
12: Aij = A
i−1
j ,∀j ∈ [i− 1]− {j
∗}.
13: end for
Output: Allocation A = (Aij)0≤i≤n,0≤j≤i.
Theorem 1. For any n ≥ 1, 1-recallable algorithm A1DFD is O(log n)-proportional for the DFD
problem with n players.
Proof. In the following, we prove the theorem by induction. When there is only 1 player, algorithm
A1DFD is proportional since the player gets the whole resource. Assuming that when there are i− 1
players, algorithm A1DFD is 2(3+ln(i−1))-proportional, we show that when player i arrives at time
ti, algorithm A1DFD is 2(3 + ln i)-proportional.
First, we show that for any j < i, player j is 2(3 + ln i)-proportional at time ti. Note that at
least σj elements from {A
i−1
j,1 , · · · , A
i−1
j,⌊2i(3+ln i)⌋} is allocated to player j and player j has the same
value for them. Thus,
vj(A
i
j)
vj([0, 1])
≥
σj · vj(A
i−1
j )
⌊2i(3 + ln i)⌋ · vj([0, 1])
≥
1
2i(3 + ln i)
. (1)
Next, note that for player i, the worst case happens when his value for the resource allocated to
player j is ρj ·vi([0,1])∑
j≤i−1 ρj
, where ρj =
⌊2i(3+ln i)⌋
⌊2i(3+ln i)⌋−σj
. In any other cases, by choosing his favorite bundle,
5
player i’s value will increase. Thus,
vi([0, 1])
vi(A
i
i)
≤
∑
1≤j≤i−1
⌊2i(3 + ln i)⌋
⌊2i(3 + ln i)⌋ − σj
≤ 2
∑
1≤x≤⌈ i−1
2
⌉
⌊2i(3 + ln i)⌋
⌊2i(3 + ln i)⌋ − ⌈2(i− x)(3 + ln(i− x))⌉
≤ 2
∑
1≤x≤⌈ i−1
2
⌉
2i(3 + ln i)
2i(3 + ln i)− 2(i− x)(3 + ln i)− 2
= 2i
∑
1≤x≤⌈ i−1
2
⌉
1
x− 23+ln i
≤ 2i

3 + ∑
2≤x≤⌈ i−1
2
⌉
1
x− 23+ln i


< 2i

3 + ∑
1≤x≤⌈ i−1
2
⌉−1
1
x

 < 2i(3 + ln i)
The second inequality holds by carefully analyzing the value σj for each player j who arrived
before player i. Note that at any time tj, the algorithm can only make the assignment such that the
approximation ratio of the new arriving player and the player whose resource is recalled is 2j(3+ln j),
while the approximation ratio for all other players remain unchanged. Thus when player i arrives,
there exist at least i + 1 − 2x players with approximation ratio less than 2(i − x)(3 + ln(i − x)).
By properly eliminating the rounding in the term, the third inequality holds. The fourth inequality
holds because the first term in the summation is at most 3. The last two inequalities hold trivially.
Therefore, by induction, algorithm A1DFD is O(log n)-proportional and Theorem 1 holds.
Next we show how to design the O(n)-envy-free algorithm A2DFD, which is quite similar to
algorithm A1DFD. Briefly speaking, A
2
DFD allocates the whole resource to the first player. Then,
when player i arrives, for each player j < i, A2DFD uniformly divides the resource allocated to player
j into i equal subsets and let player i chooses his favorite set. The formal description is omitted
here due to the space limit.
Theorem 2. For any n ≥ 1, 1-recallable algorithm A2DFD is O(n)-envy-free for the DFD problem
with n players.
Proof. Again we prove by induction. When player 1 arrives, A11 is exactly [0, 1]. That is, A
2
DFD is
envy-free. Assume that for player i ≥ 2, A2DFD is (i − 1)-envy-free at time ti−1. Now let us prove
that all i players are i-envy-free at time ti by analyzing their value at time ti.
First, we prove that player i is i-envy-free at time ti. Assume that the allocation of player j,
Ai−1j , is partitioned into i sets {A
i−1
j,1 , · · · , A
i−1
j,i }. Since player i is allocated with his favorite set
Ai−1j∗,k∗ ∈ {A
i−1
j,k }j<i,k≤i, for any j < i,
vi(A
i
i) ≥ vi(A
i−1
j∗,k∗) ≥
1
i
vi(A
i−1
j ) ≥
1
i
vi(A
i
j). (2)
Next, we show that for any j ∈ [i−1], player j is i-envy-free at time ti. By induction hypothesis,
for any j, j′ ∈ [i− 1],
vj(A
i−1
j ) ≥
1
i− 1
vj(A
i−1
j′ ).
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Note that Ai−1j is partitioned into i sets with equal values, and at most one of them is allocated to
player i. Hence, for any j, j′ ∈ [i− 1],
vj(A
i
j) ≥
i− 1
i
vj(A
i−1
j ) ≥
1
i
vj(A
i−1
j′ ) ≥
1
i
vj(A
i
j′). (3)
Since the allocation of player i at time ti is also a subset of player j∗’s allocation at time i− 1,
according to Inequality 3, we have
vj(A
i
j) ≥
1
i
vj(A
i−1
j∗ ) ≥
1
i
vj(A
i
i). (4)
Combining Inequalities 2, 3 and 4, all players are i-envy-free at time ti. By induction, algorithm
A2DFD is n-envy-free. Thus finishes the proof of Theorem 2.
We have designed an 1-recallable algorithm which is O(n)-envy-free for the DFD problem with
general valuations. Next we show that this bound is almost tight by proving that all 1-recallable
algorithms must be at least Ω( nlogn)-envy-free, even if the players’ valuations are piecewise uniform
(DFDPU). Formally, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3. For any 1-recallable algorithm A (except empty algorithm) for the DFDPU problem,
A is Ω( nlogn)-envy-free with n players.
Proof. Assume there exists an algorithm A which is ξ-envy-free and not empty. Consider the
following adversary instance where for player 1, v1(I) = |I| and for any player i ≥ 2, vi(I) =
|I∩Ai−11 |
|Ai−11 |
.
That is, the first player wants the whole resource and each new arriving player only wants the
resource allocated to the first player by A at time ti−1. Since A is ξ-envy-free and not empty, we
must have Ai1 6= ∅,∀i ≤ n, and the adversary instance is well defined.
First we consider the envy-freeness for player i ≥ 2. Since the resource that player i values is
exactly the resource allocated to player 1 at time ti−1, to ensure that player i is ξ-envy-free at time
ti, the algorithm must recall the resource from player 1’s and reallocate at least 11+ξ fraction of the
resource to player i. Therefore,
v1(A
i
1) ≤ (1−
1
1 + ξ
)v1(A
i−1
1 ),
for any i ≥ 2. Accordingly,
v1(A
n
1 ) ≤ (1−
1
1 + ξ
)n−2v1(A
2
1). (5)
When all n players have arrived, to ensure that player 1 is ξ-envy-free, we have
v1(A
n
1 ) ≥
1
ξ
v1(A
n
2 ) =
1
ξ
v1(A
2
2)
=
1
ξ|A11|
v2(A
2
2) ≥
1
ξ2|A11|
v2(A
2
1) =
1
ξ2
v1(A
2
1). (6)
The first and the second inequality holds due to the ξ-envy-freeness of player 1 at time tn and
player 2 at time t2. The first equality holds because player 1 is always the player who needs to be
recalled. Therefore, Ai2 = A
2
2 for any 2 ≤ i ≤ n. The second and the last equality holds because by
the construction of the valuations of player 1 and player 2, v1(I) = 1|A11|
v2(I) for any I ⊆ A11.
Combining inequalities 5 and 6, we have
(1−
1
1 + ξ
)n−2 ≥
1
ξ2
.
By solving the above inequality, ξ = Ω( nlogn) and Theorem 3 holds.
7
Remark. Given a valuation profile v, we say an allocation A is non-wasteful if for all player i, we
only allocate the resource that he values to him. That is, ∀i ≤ j ≤ n, ∀I ⊆ Aji , vi(I) > 0. We say
an algorithm A is non-wasteful for valuation space V if for any v ∈ V, A(v) is non-wasteful. Then
if we consider the τ -recallable algorithm where τ can be any constant, the adversary instance in
the proof of Theorem 3 still shows that no non-wasteful algorithm can be o( nlog n)-envy-free even for
piecewise uniform valuations.
4 When the Valuation Function is Uniform with Demand (UD)
In this section, we study the dynamic fair division problem with uniform with demand valuations.
Since in this model, the players do not care which part of the resource is allocated to him, we regard
the allocation Aij in A = (A
i
j)0≤i≤n,0≤j≤i as the size of the allocated resource.
For the UD problem, a simple greedy algorithm is 2-envy-free and 2-proportional. However, our
main focus in this section is its performance under the more demanding fairness solution concept.
First we consider the following special case where the smallest demand is within a constant fraction
of the largest demand. This case will provide enough intuition about solving the general case. In
order to make our algorithm clear, we explicitly write out all the parameters in ASUD(d, c, η), where
the algorithm has those extra parameters as input. Here parameter d is the minimum demand
in the adversary instance and c is the ratio between the largest and smallest demand. Note that
cd ≤ 1. Also, η is an extra parameter representing the total amount of resource can be allocated
to the arriving players. Algorithm ASUD is formally defined in Algorithm 2. The general idea of the
algorithm is to treat each arriving player’s demand as the maximum demand, and the total demand
as the minimum sum. Then the algorithm only allocates the resource to each arriving player such
that the approximation ratio is not violated. The performance of the algorithm is analyzed in
Lemma 1.
Algorithm 2 1-Recallable Algorithm ASUD(d, c, η)
Input: A sequence of players N = {1, · · · , n} arriving and departing along time.
1: Initially, Aij = 0 for all 0 ≤ i ≤ n, 0 ≤ j ≤ i.
2: for any arriving player i ≥ 1 do
3: Let j∗ = argmax1≤j≤i−1{A
i−1
j }.
4: Set Aii = A
i
j∗ =
d
2η ln 3·max{d·i,1} .
5: Aij = A
i−1
j ,∀j ∈ [i− 1]− {j
∗}.
6: Ai0 = A
0
0 −
∑
j∈[i]A
i
j .
7: end for
Output: Allocation A = (Aij)0≤i≤n,0≤j≤i.
Lemma 1. ∀c, d, η > 0, algorithm ASUD is (2cη ln 3)-fair and at most
1
η fraction of the resource is
allocated.
Proof. We first show that algorithm ASUD is well defined by showing that the reallocation in Step 4
is always feasible and the total allocated resource is no more than 1η . First note that
d
2η ln 3·max{i·d,1}
is non-increasing with respect to i. Next we divide the analysis into three cases.
Case 1: i ≤ ⌊1d⌋. When i ≤ ⌊
1
d⌋, A
i
j =
d
2η ln 3 for all j ≤ i. Therefore,
∑
j∈[i]A
i
j =
id
2η ln 3 ≤
1
2η ln 3 <
1
η . In this case, no resource is recalled and the total allocation never exceed
1
η .
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Case 2: ⌊1d⌋ < i ≤ 2⌊
1
d⌋. In this case, the first ⌊
1
d⌋ players still satisfy Case 1, but when the
(⌊1d⌋+ l)-th player arrives, player l’s allocation will be recalled, where 1 ≤ l ≤ i− ⌊
1
d⌋. Then both
player l and (⌊1d⌋+ l) will be allocated with
1
2η ln 3·(⌊ 1
d
⌋+l)
. The total allocated resource is
(2⌊
1
d
⌋ − i)
d
2η ln 3
+ 2
i−⌊ 1
d
⌋∑
l=1
1
2η ln 3 · (⌊1d⌋+ l)
≤
1
η
.
The above inequality holds by analyzing the monotonicity.
Case 3: i > 2⌊1d⌋. When i > 2⌊
1
d⌋, all the resource allocated to the first ⌊
i
2⌋ players will be
recalled. In Algorithm ASUD, whenever the resource is recalled from a player, the algorithm will
create two sets of resource with the same size, and allocate them to both the recalled player and the
new arriving player. Thus the total allocated resource in this case is at most twice of the resource
allocated to players from ⌊ i2⌋ to i, that is,
2
i∑
l=⌊ i
2
⌋
1
2η ln 3 · l
≤
1
η ln 3
ln
i
⌊ i2⌋
≤
1
η
.
Finally, we analyze the performance of ASUD. At anytime ti, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, since player i’s demand
di ≤ c · d, his value for allocation Aii is vi(A
i
i) ≥
1
2cη ln 3·max{i·d,1} . When player i arrives, the total
demand
∑
l≤i dl ≥ d · i, and the value of player i at time ti is
vi(A
i
i) ≥
1
2cη ln 3 ·max{
∑
l≤i dl, 1}
.
Similarly, the value of any player j < i satisfies the above inquality. Therefore, algorithm ASUD is
(2cη ln 3)-fair, and thus finishes the proof of Lemma 1.
Next we design the algorithm AUD for the valuations with arbitrary demands, which is formally
defined in Algorithm 3. The idea for this algorithm is to classify the players with demands that
differ up to a constant factor into the same group and run the algorithm ASUD for the players in
each group. By analyzing the performance of algorithm AUD, we have the following theorem.
Algorithm 3 1-Recallable Algorithm AUD
Input: A sequence of players N = {1, · · · , n} arriving and departing along time. Each player i ∈ N
has demand di. Let m = ⌈log n⌉.
1: Divide the demand space [0, 1] into m + 1 sets (S0, S1, . . . , Sm), where S0 = [0, 2−m], Sl =
(2−l, 21−l], l ∈ [m].
2: for player i with demand di do
3: Find j such that di ∈ Sj .
4: Aii =
21−j
2η ln 3max{
∑
l≤i dl,1}
.
5: Let i∗ = argmaxi′{A
i−1
i′ |di′ ∈ Sj}.
6: Aii∗ = A
i
i, and A
i
i′ = A
i−1
i′ ,∀i
′ 6= i, i∗.
7: Ai0 = 1−
∑
j∈[i]A
i
j .
8: end for
Output: Allocation (Aij)0≤i≤n,0≤j≤i.
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Theorem 4. ∀n ≥ 1, 1-recallable algorithm AUD is O(log n)-fair for the UD problem with n players.
Proof. It is clear that AUD classifies all players in m+1 sets. Let Nj denote the set of players with
demand in Sj. Then except the players in N0, the demands of the players in the same set differ up
to a constant factor 2.
First we find the parameter η such that algorithm AUD is feasible. For players in N0, since the
maximum demand is at most 1n and there are at most n players in total, the resource allocated to
those players is bounded by 12η ln 3 . For player i in Nj , where j ∈ [m], the total demand when player
i arrives is at least the total demand of the players in Nj who arrived before player i. Using the
similar argument in Lemma 1 and applying the case studies, the total resource allocated to players
in Nj is at most 1η . By setting η = 1 +m = 1 + ⌈log n⌉, algorithm AUD is always feasible. Then,
similar to Lemma 1, it is easy to get that algorithm AUD is (4η ln 3)-fair, which is O(log n)-fair.
Therefore, Theorem 4 holds.
Next we construct an adversary instance for the UD problem to show that the bound of our
algorithm is tight. Formally, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 5. For any 1-recallable algorithm A for the UD problem, A is Ω(log n)-fair with n players.
Proof. Let A be any 1-recallable algorithm which is η-fair. Here we consider the following adversary
instance. In order to make the instance clear, we describe the arriving players by m = logn3 rounds
(n is a large enough integer such that m is also a large enough integer). Formally, within stage
j ≤ m, nj = n2×4j−1 players arrive one by one and each of them has demand
8j
n . That is, in the
first round, n2 players arrive one by one and each of them has demand
8
n . For each of the following
rounds, the number of the arriving players decreases by a multiplicative factor of 4, but the demand
of each player increases by a multiplicative factor of 8. Note that in the last round the demand of
each player is 8
m
n = 1. Also, the total number of players in the designed instance is
∑
j≤m nj < n.
Thus this instance is well defined, and it is sufficient to prove that all 1-recallable algorithm is
Ω(log n)-fair for this instance.
In each stage j ≤ m, the total number of players that would arrive in the future is less than
u = (
n
2× 4j
)
/
(1−
1
4
) =
n
6× 4j−1
.
It is easy to see that u = 13nj. Therefore, at least
2
3nj =
n
3×4j−1
players who arrive during the jth
round won’t get recalled by in the future. Then we can lower bound the resource allocated to those
players. First note that the total demand before stage j is
∑
j′<j
n
2×4j′−1
× 8
j′
n =
∑
j′<j
8j
′
2×4j′−1
.
The total demand when the ith player in stage j arrives is
Di =
∑
j′<j
8j
′
2× 4j′−1
+
8j · i
n
.
Since algorithm A is an 1-recallable algorithm, for any integer x ≤ nj+12 , there exists at least
nj + 1− 2x players whose allocated resource is at least 8
j
nη·Dnj−x
. Thus the total resource allocated
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to the players in stage j is
Lj ≥
2
η
n
6×4j−1∑
i=1
8j
n ·Dnj−i
=
2
η
n
6×4j−1∑
i=1
8j
n∑
j′<j
8j′
2×4j′−1
+ 8
j
2×4j−1
− 8
j ·i
n
=
2
η
n
6×4j−1∑
i=1
8j
n
2j+2 − 2− 8
j ·i
n
≥
2
η
n
6×4j−1∑
i=1
8j
n
2j+2 − 8
j ·i
n
=
2
η
n
6×4j−1∑
i=1
1
4n
4j
− i
→
2
η
[
ln
4n
4j
− ln(
4n
4j
−
n
6× 4j−1
)
]
=
2 ln 65
η
,
when we set n→∞. Thus the total allocated resource is
1 ≥
∑
j≤ logn
3
Lj ≥
2 ln 65 log n
3η
.
Therefore, η ≥ 23 ln
6
5 log n and Theorem 5 holds.
Remark If we consider τ -recallable algorithms here, where τ is a constant, by designing the similar
adversary instance, except that the number of players and the demand change in the ratio of 14τ
and 8τ respectively between each stage, we can still obtain the Ω(log n) lower bound.
5 Conclusion and Future Direction
In this paper, we study the dynamic fair division problem with a divisible resource. We design
O(log n)-proportional and O(n)-envy-free algorithms for players with general valuations. We also
show that those bounds are tight up to a logarithmic factor. However, for the valuations that are
uniform with demand, we design an O(log n)-fair algorithm and we prove that this ratio is tight.
There are a lot of future directions that are worth exploring. An immediate open question is
whether we can find algorithms with better approximation ratio for τ -recallable algorithms without
the non-wasteful assumption when τ ≥ 2. Another particularly interesting question is to consider
the problem via a game theoretic view in the dynamic setting. Moreover, the dynamic version of
allocating multiple indivisible resources is also worthy of the effort.
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